EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the second nuclear age, no less than the first, there are no realistic prospects for banning multiple-warhead missiles. China has started to deploy such missiles, and India and Pakistan are likely to cross this threshold as well. The motivations behind these steps will determine how extensively nuclear arsenals will grow and how pernicious the effects of stockpile growth will become. Success in dampening the negative repercussions of multiple-warhead missiles will rest on two foundations. The first is improved bilateral relations among the contestants. One of the responsibilities of states that possess nuclear weapons is to pursue nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) with other nuclear-armed states, especially those with which they have previously fought wars. By this yardstick, China, India, and Pakistan can be found wanting. A willingness to improve bilateral relations is measurable in many ways. It is affirmed by: the absence of firing across and aggressive patrolling nearby unsettled borders; the avoidance of violent acts emanating from one country’s soil that can lead to intense crises; failing that, the successful judicial prosecution of higher-ups; engagement in meaningful strategic dialogue that produces NRRMs; and preventing increased trade or improved relations from being held hostage to issues that are not ripe for settlement. Here again, all three states can be found wanting. The second foundation for dampening the negative consequences of multiple-warhead missiles in Asia is to resist a progression from countervalue to counterforce targeting strategies of nuclear deterrence. This metric, as with the willingness to improve bilateral relations, is measurable in several ways, including: the retention of no first use (NFU) doctrines by China and India; proceeding slowly with limited numbers of multiple-warhead missiles; and being more transparent about strategic modernization plans and programs. China will set the tone for this competition. India will likely indulge in technological advances as well. And Pakistan, the country least equipped to engage in an accelerated competition, is most susceptible to this dynamic as it seeks to keep pace with India. Unlike the first nuclear age, it is possible to dampen the extent of warhead increases due to multiple-warhead missiles. But even modest increments in multiple-warhead missiles — resulting in perhaps 200 warheads among the competitors over the next 10-15 years — will ratchet up the triangular, interactive nuclear competition in Asia. If the growth of warhead totals and missile accuracy presages moves by Beijing and New Delhi toward warfighting strategies of deterrence, then the second nuclear age
The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs
9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

will become far more dangerous, and prospects for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons on international affairs will be undermined. If decision

makers in China, India, and Pakistan wish to avoid repeating the missteps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the first nuclear age, they will limit the extent to which multiple warheads are placed atop missiles, they will proceed at a slow pace, and, most important, they will reject the lure and pitfalls of counterforce targeting strategies.

KEY TERMS & ACRONYMS
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ASAT Anti-Satellite
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense CEP Circular Error Probable
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
C3 Command, Control, and Communications
DAE Department of Atomic Energy (India)
DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation (India)
HTK Hard-Target Kill
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IRBM Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile
ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations (Pakistan)
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
LACM Land-Attack Cruise Missile
LNO Limited Nuclear Options
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
MaRV Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle
MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle NCA National Command Authority (Pakistan)
NESCOM National Engineering and Scientific Commission (Pakistan)
NFU No First Use
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA National Security Advisor
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (United States)
PBV Post-Boost Vehicle
PLA People’s Liberation Army (China)
PMO Prime Minister’s Office (India)
PSA Principal Scientific Advisor (India)
RV Re-entry Vehicle
SAC Strategic Air Command (United States)
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SFC Strategic Forces Command (India)
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan (United States)
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SNF Strategic Nuclear Forces
SP Special Projects (United States)
SPD Strategic Plans Division (Pakistan)
SPS Strategic Program Staff (India) SRF Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet Union)
SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (Pakistan)
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION
The dawn of the first nuclear age came as a great shock. The assumption of waging wars by “ironmongery,” with the outcome determined over time by remorseless acts of cumulative punishment, was immediately upended. With stunning effect, the “absolute” weapon was unveiled. The Bomb could be used as a war-winning weapon or, paradoxically, it could be too powerful to be used in war.1 Other shocking technological advances followed the “atomic” bomb in quick succession: far more destructive “hydrogen” bombs, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could devastate cities less than 30 minutes after launch, and the ballistic missile-carrying submarine that could shorten even those flight times. During this harrowing progression, the fear of surprise attack dominated public discourse and strategic analysis. Vulnerability never seemed so great. The nuclear arms race between the superpowers didn’t stop there; these technological advances were mere preludes to an even more intensified strategic competition marked by the advent of MIRVs — multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles — atop land- and sea-based missiles. MIRVs propelled vertical proliferation more than any other technological advance during the first nuclear age. The growth of warhead numbers begged the question of what the warheads would target. A counter value target, such as a city, has value to an adversary but does not present a military threat. A counterforce target, such as a missile garrison, has military value to an adversary and presents a military threat. If the accuracy of a missile and warhead are sufficient, and if the location of a target is well known, a warhead can be used for counter value as well as counterforce targeting. Having an arsenal of relatively inaccurate warheads in limited numbers does not place an adversary’s nuclear capabilities at risk and is consistent, therefore, with counter value targeting. By contrast, possessing many warheads that can be delivered with high accuracy is consistent with counterforce targeting. Increases in multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) that are not independently targetable would allow for the expansion of counter value targeting. Increases in MIRVs and missile accuracy would allow for the expansion of counterforce targeting.

Pakistan

Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor Ahmed

PAKISTAN

Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting Strategic competition between Pakistan and India is intensifying. Both countries have now entered into a phase of modernization and

expansion of their respective strategic forces, reflecting significant investments in strategic programs. Their fissile material production capacities have grown substantially

and they have inducted a plethora of new delivery systems. Both are in the process of fielding nuclear triads. Technological advancements are underway

in: modern combat aircraft and air defense capabilities; cruise and ballistic missiles; sea-based deterrents; tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs); ballistic missile defense (BMD); and

multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). India and Pakistan now possess more new types of nuclear weapon

delivery vehicles than the United States.1 To complement these developments, there are advancements in: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

technologies; communications and navigation; precision-strike weapons; anti-satellite (ASAT) technology; and cyberwarfare capabilities. These technological

innovations have the potential to erode strategic stability on the subcontinent.2